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when he enters the contract. He probably is unaware of the importance of his venue rights and consequently can see no harm in such a condition. When litigation does arise he quite unexpectedly finds himself at
a serious disadvantage as against an adversary who has chosen his forum
well. For example, a buyer might have to travel hundreds of miles to defend himself in the court of the vendor's choosing. The court was aware
of the problem of overreaching and pointed out that it was not shown to
exist in this case, but it is rather the possibility of overreaching which concerns us, since it is that which lends weight to the proposition that it is not
necessarily in the public interest to permit contracting away venue rights.
The second consideration is that of possible economic coercion. A buyer of small means is often in no position to haggle over details, and if sellers
as a class should require waiver of venue rights as a standard contract provision, the freedom of contract which the majority position envisions would
be illusory. It may be the better part of public policy to protect such persons against their own economic weakness. At least the contrary rule
adopted here is not unassailable.
Thus there is a sharp contrast between agreeing to a particular place
of trial after the litigation has commenced, when the effect of the agreement is apparent and the parties are on equal terms, and setting venue by
contract in advance. The statute permitting changing of venue by stipulation in court may have been intended by the legislature to mean just that
and no more.
JAMES SORTE
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TENANT -
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IMPLIED

COVENANT

RESTRICTING

UsE OF PREMisEs-Plaintiff leased premises to Safeway Stores, the lease
allowing the lessee to make alterations necessary for "its use" of the building, and also permitting assignment and subletting. A sublessee, the
Roosevelt-Osborne Motor Co., was using the premises as a garage, and was
about to cut a fourteen-foot doorway in the front of the building. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that such use was contrary
to the terms of the lease. The district court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The alterations
were permitted by the terms of the lease, and no implied covenant restricting the use of the leased premises will be raised. Twrman v. Safeaway
Stores, Inc., 317 P.2d 302 (Mont. 1957). (Justices Bottomly and Adair dissenting).
In the instant case the court decided two issues-whether the alteration would constitute waste and whether there was an implied covenant
to use the premises only for food store purposes. Although somewhat interrelated in the present case, these issues are separable and will be so
treated here.
Ordinarily, as the court itself concedes, an alteration such as that contemplated by the garage company (a fourteen-foot doorway cut in the front
of the building) would constitute waste-a permanent, physical injury to
the freehold. Therefore the question confronting the court was whether
this alteration by the sublessee was authorized by the alteration clause.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1957
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The majority held that the clause which provided: "Lessee may make
such . . . alterations . . . as it may deem desirable for its use,"

plainly

and unambiguously permitted Safeway to alter the premises for whatever
use it might have for them, and that by virtue of the clause permitting
subletting the same permission was extended to any sublessee. Consequently the doorway was authorized as desirable for the use which the sublessee
-was making of the premises.
On the other hand, the dissent also insisted that the words of the lease
are plain and unambiguous, and that "its use" referred only to Safeway
and only to alterations for food store purposes. This writer's opinion is
that the phrase "its use" is obviously ambiguous. The fact that the court
is divided shows this. If this be true, it would appear that the court should
have considered appellant's offered parol evidence in an attempt to resolve
the ambiguity and explain what the parties meant by "its use."'
The second issue was whether an implied covenant could be found restricting the use of the demised premises to that which the parties contemplated at the time of the lease. The question of waste is entirely separate,
for it is quite obvious that a restriction on use may be breached without
waste and, on the other hand, waste may be committed without breach of an
implied restriction. However, in this case if an implied restriction had been
found which excluded use as a garage, both contentions of the appellant
would have been satisfied: the cutting of the doorway would have been
waste, and the implied covenant would have been breached. Thus the two
issues are interrelated, though capable of separate treatment, as stated
above.
The court admits that the lease itself and the evidence show unmistakably that the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the
lease was that the building would be used for food store purposes.! In the
court's opinion, however, this was not sufficient to raise an implied restriction on use. Since words indicating a particular use, or authorizing that
use, are generally held to be permissive rather than restrictive, the majority
felt that an intended use, regardless of how strong that intent may be,
can be only permissive. The court, however, indicated that there was one
situation in which an implied covenant may be recognized. This is where
the implication would be necessary to effectuate express language in the
lease as distinguished from the intent of the parties.
Tiffany states that in the absence of statute or express stipulation, a
tenant is in no way restricted in his use of the premises, except that he may
not commit waste or create a nuisance.! This appears to be the general
rule in the United States. Furthermore, the prevailing view throughout
'Plaintiff's offer of proof wag to the effect that when Safeway's agents were asked
the reasons for the assignment clause they advised that it was necessary for intercorporate transfers among the different organizations through which Safeway op2erated.
Instant case at 306. Descriptive words in the lease provided that the premises were
to comply with all regulations applicable tb a building to be used for the sale of
food, and that the lessor was not to let any other building.within fifty feet under
his control be used to store or sell groceries, meat, fruit, vegetables or bakery goods.
81 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 122 (1910).
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the country is that no implied covenant is raised by the intended use of the
premises."
The contrary argument, in favor of implied restrictions, finds its historical basis in the early Alabama case of Nave v. Berry." That case established a rule which has received wide support from the courts. It was there
held that the lessee has the right to make any use of the premises not materially different from that in which they were usually employed, or for
which they were adapted or constructed. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Nelson,"
a recent Alabama case having facts quite similar to the present case and
therefore cited by the dissent, affirmed the rule of the Berry case.
The dissent's position in the present case, however, goes one step further than the Alabama rule. The dissent would base an implied restriction
on the use contemplated by the parties to the lease-not merely the use for
which the building was constructed or adapted. In support of this position
they relied on the Louisiana case of Boh v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation. Although Louisiana has a statute providing that no covenant
will be implied in any conveyance of real estate, the court held that the
"circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease may be looked to in
order to determine the use contemplated by the parties, and the intention
of the parties is controlling." The persuasiveness of this holding is diminished, however, by the fact that it is based on authority derived from European Civil Law. The construction applied by the Louisiana courts is admitted by them to be substantially the same as that applied by the French
courts to the corresponding provision of the French Civil Code of 1729.'
Montana also has a statute which has been held to prohibit all implied covenants but two.' Since it applies to conveyances which pass a possessory
title, leases would seem to be included. Whether the statute in question prohibits implied restrictions on the use of premises by a lessee has not been decided in this state; but under the recent decision construing the statute, implied easements have been abolished.'
The dissent relies heavily on the Montana hiring statute,' taking the
position that under this statute the intended use of the premises controls
'See Ann., 46 A.L.R. 1134 (1927) ; 148 A.L.R. 583 (1944) ; 2 A.L.R. 2d 1148 (1948).
'22 Ala. 382 (1853).
'See 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 122 (1910) ; 36 C.J., Landlord and Tenant
§ 710; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant § 326; 32 AM. JiM, Landlord and Tenant
§ 203. In 1 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra, at 799, in reference to Nave v. Berry, the author
writes: "On the other hand It has been said in one case that the tenant can use the
premises for that purpose only in which they are usually employed, to which they
are adapted, and for which they were constructed, a criterion, it may be remarked,
which appears somewhat lacking in definiteness."
7204
Ala. 172, 85 So. 449, 13 A.L.R. 820 (1920).
'128 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1942).
'New Orleans and C. R. Co. v. Darms, 39 La. Ann. 766, 2 So. 230 (1887).
"REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-1616, as construed in Simonson v. McDonald,
311 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1957). The statute allows two Implied covenants from use of
the word "grant": (1) that the grantor has not previously conveyed the estate to
any other person, and (2)' that the estate is free from any encumbrances.
"Simonson v. McDonald, 311 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1957), 19 MONTANA L. REv. 73 (1957).
WREvIsnD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 42-106: "When a thing is let for a particular
purpose, the hirer must not use it for any other purposes; and if he does, the latter
may hold him responsible for Its safety during such use in all events, or may treat
the contract as thereby rescinded."
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and may be shown by parol. Under an identical statute in California,' it
was held that unless the lease specifically limits the use, or raises a restriction necessarily implied from the language employed, it is not forfeited by
a different use, even if illegal. '
The decision is specific: The Montana Supreme Court will not raise
an implied covenant restricting the use of leased property to the use contemplated by the parties. The court may well have regarded the general
prohibition against waste as a sufficient safeguard of the lessor's interest, but it is arguable that it is an inadequate safeguard in the
hght of the present decision.' At any rate it is clear that the apparent
harshness of the present decision arises from the majority's position that
the use of a food store building for the purpose of a garage, in and of itself,
is not a substantial injury to the inheritance and therefore waste. Whether
or not this is so, it seems, is a question to be resolved according to the facts
of each case.
The instant case gives warning to lawyers, in their capacity as drafters
of lease agreements, to deal explicitly with possibilities of use, and not to
rely on reasonable implications which arise from the circumstances of the
agreement.
WILLIAM CONKLIN
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TION-Claimant was involved in an accident during an oil drilling operation of his employer, but suffered no apparent present harm. A rib injury
was discovered approximately one year later. Within 120 days thereafter
he brought action under the Kansas workmen's compensation statute, which
required written claim "within one hundred twenty days after the accident." Claimant recovered judgment in the district court allowing compensation. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, held, reversed.
Where the statute requires claim to be filed within 120 days from the date
of accident, it is irrelevant that the resulting. injury was not discovered
until that time had elapsed. Rutledge v. Sandlin, 310 P.2d 950 (Kan.
1957).
The workmen's compensation laws of all states but two provide for
time limitations on filing claims for compensation.' The statutes of a
majority of the states include provisions that no claim for compensation
will be allowed unless filed within a certain period of time after the injury." The courts of those states whose limitation statutes use the word
"CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1930 (Deering 1949).

"Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal. App. 2d 110, 108 P.2d 479 (1950).
'5The instant case points up a dilemma which may arise by reason of the holding.
Alterations are permitted by the lease if deemed desirable for the lessee's use.
Under the rule announced by the court there is no restriction regarding the use of
the premises. Since any use of the building is allowed, any alterations consistent
with that use would also be allowed. Under such a construction as this the lessor
must have granted much more than he intended.
'See Landauer v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 175 Ore. 418, 154 P.2d 189,
197 (1944) (dictum).
21d., 154 P.2d at 201.
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